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Abstract
In response to increasing cybersecurity threats,
government and private agencies have increasingly
hired offensive security experts: "red-hat” hackers.
They differ from the better-known “white-hat”
hackers in applying the methods of cybercriminals
against cybercriminals and counter or preemptively
attacking, rather than focusing on defending against
attacks. Often considered the vigilantes of the hacker
ecosystem, they work under the same rules as would
be hackers, attackers, hacktivists, organized cybercriminals, and state-sponsored attackers—which can
easily lead them into the unethical practices often
associated with such groups. Utilizing the virtue
(ethics) theory and cyber attribution, we argue that
there exists a dichotomy among offensive security
engineers, one that appreciates organizational
security practices, but at the same time violates ethics
in how to retaliate against a malicious attacker.

1. Introduction
Currently, there is a hacker attack every 39
seconds, affecting one in three Americans each year
[10]. As the Internet penetrates more deeply into
people’s daily lives, the vectors of attack for
cybercriminals and hackers will continue to multiply,
and, as Internet use continues to expand, the total
number of cyber-attacks grows annually and the
potential damage from cyber-attacks also increases.
According to Gartner, the consistent rise of
cybercrime has amplified information security
spending to more than $86.4 billion in 2017 [36]. That
value does not include an accounting of the Internet of
Things (IoT), industrial control systems (ICS),
automotive security, and other cybersecurity
categories. According to a Cryptologic Program
budget analysis, the intelligence community invested
roughly one-third of the total cyber-operations budget
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of roughly $1.02 billion on defense of military and
other classified computer networks against foreign
attacks in fiscal year 2013 [17]. Though economic
calculations vary extensively and are difficult to make,
cybercrime and data loss have been estimated to cost
the global economy at least $1 trillion annually [12].
A generalized definition of cybercrime may be
“unlawful acts wherein the computer is either a tool or
target or both” (as cited in [5], p. 141). But those who
commit cybercrimes may have different motivations
from those who initiate cyber-attacks.
Cyber-attacks have the potential to cause
substantial and wide-ranging harm across a number of
critical arenas. These targeted attacks against nuclear
infrastructure, such as Stuxnet [6]; attacks against
commercial entities, such as the Sony hack [19];
attacks against government infrastructure, such as the
Estonia DDoS attack [37]; and attacks against political
entities, such as the Democratic National Committee
(DNC) hack [23]. Cutting-edge spyware or malware is
likely to be found on the computers of senior
government officials or on important network systems
within national critical infrastructures. Governments,
corporations, and individuals have prudently
responded to these cybercrime trends by hardening
their cyber defenses. For instance, shortly after the
Sony Pictures hacks, the United States and the United
Kingdom announced a series of “cyber war games” to
prepare their government agencies for the potential of
broad-based cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure,
including the banking and financial sector (BBC News,
2015). War has both defensive and offensive aspects,
both in real space and in cyber war. U.S. agencies
define offensive cyber operations as activities
intended “to manipulate, disrupt, deny, degrade, or
destroy information resident in computers or computer
networks, or the computers and networks themselves,”
according to the Offensive Cyber Effects Operations
(OCEO) presidential directive in 2012. The
government employs several hackers to carry out
offensive actions against cyber adversaries
internationally. Too much emphasis is placed on
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offensive retaliation by these hackers. Overconcentrating on offense can be dangerous and
destabilizing because it encourages offensive actors to
attack first and ferociously before an adversary can
[34].
The term hacking has evolved over the years, but
in general, it refers to the use of a computer to gain
unauthorized access to information systems or to
exploit the weaknesses of computer networks [21].
“Hacker” can mean either someone who compromises
computer security or a skilled developer in the free or
open-source software movements [22]. Hacks are
deployed for various reasons as diverse as the thrill of
the conquest, protests, profit, and bolstering status
within the hacker community. Notably, hackers are not
inherently bad, nor does the word “hacker”
definitively mean “criminal.”
Offensive security engineers are known as “red
hat” hackers, who use hacking techniques to perform
their job functions. (This is as opposed to “white-hat”
hackers, who work primarily defensively, and “blackhat” hackers, who act maliciously). Red hats are
considered the vigilantes of the hacker community
when responding to cyber attribution. For several
years, the U.S. military has employed offensive
security engineers to attack cyber adversaries using
potent cyber weapons or cyber tools that can break into
enemy computers [18]. Offensive security techniques
have since spread to business communities and social
media platforms such as Facebook. Demand continues
to grow in government and industry circles for
engineers with offensive skills and ever-moresophisticated cyber tools, including malicious
software with such destructive potential as to qualify
as cyberweapons implanted in an enemy's network
[18].
Despite all of the security countermeasures
implemented by security practitioners, the protection
of data and other asset security is an ongoing process
with no winners. As their work continues to evolve,
offensive security engineers must know and adhere to
the ethical practices of an organization so that the
appropriate security policies are upheld, preventing
illegitimate access. Yet, at the same time, they may
easily succumb to their hacker vices when presented
with an adversarial attack situation. This article
investigates the ethical dichotomy of offensive
security engineers, employing virtue (ethics) theory
and cyber attribution. Therefore, answers were sought
to the following specific research question:
Do offensive security engineers or hackers find it
unethical to retaliate against nation-state actors?

2. Contribution to Information Systems
Modern threats — such as worms, viruses,
phishing, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and botnets
— underscore the need for offensive security research
in an increasingly networked and computer-reliant
society. Responses to these cyber threats vary from
passive observation to the legal right to defend
computer systems using aggressive countermeasures
[14]. Such Internet security research is itself at one
extreme of a broad spectrum of computer security
research. We propose, however, that the information
systems (IS) field should incorporate features of
offensive security research which will require
organizations to enable continued growth of the field.

3. Offensive Security Background
Currently, there are different authorities and rules
of engagement for offensive as opposed to defensive
cyber security. Offense involves exploiting systems,
penetrating systems with cyber-attacks, and generally
leveraging broken software to compromise entire
systems and systems of systems [32]. Conversely,
defense means building secure software, designing
and engineering systems to be secure in the first place,
and creating incentives and rewards for systems that
are built to be secure [33]. Ultimately, offensive
security is a proactive and adversarial approach to
protecting computer systems, networks, and
individuals from attacks.
A major revelation of offensive security practices
came with the discovery of Stuxnet in 2010, a
computer sabotage operation reportedly conducted by
the United States and Israel to destroy machines used
in Iran's nuclear program. Stuxnet is a large, complex
piece of malware with many different components and
functionalities, written to target an industrial control
system (ICS) or set of similar systems [15], such as
those used in gas pipelines and power plants. Stuxnet
is estimated to have infected 50,000 to 100,000
computers, mostly in Iran, India, Indonesia, and
Pakistan [6] — unstable areas prior to possible cyberprompted disruptions.
Moreover, U.S. intelligence agencies initiated 231
offensive cyber operations in 2011, nearly threequarters of them against key targets such as Iran,
Russia, China, and North Korea, some intended to
disrupt nuclear proliferation [17]. This included
placing covert implants in more than 80,000 machines
around the world. And they are not alone; China and
Russia are regarded as the most challenging cyber
threats to the United States. U.S. intelligence has come
to believe that China’s state-employed hackers by day
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return to work at night for personal profit, stealing
valuable U.S. defense industry secrets and selling
them [17] — so, threats are clearly present and must
be addressed.
President Obama’s directive on cyber-operations
stated that military cyber-operations resulting in the
disruption, destruction, or manipulation of computers
must be approved by the president [38]. This specific
directive is known as Presidential Policy Directive-20,
or PPD-20, focuses on cybersecurity as a top priority.
The policy considers the evolution of cyber threats to
the growing U.S. infrastructure, establishing
principles and processes for the use of cyber
operations so that cyber tools are integrated with the
full array of national security tools. Relevant portions
of PPD-20 include a restriction in type:
“Operations and related programs or activities —
other than network defense, cyber collection, or
DCEO — conducted by or on behalf of the United
States Government, in or through cyberspace, that are
intended to enable or produce cyber effects outside
United States Government networks.”
They also offer some sense of the emergent nature of
cyberthreats:
“Offensive Cyber Effects Operations OCEO can
offer unique and unconventional capabilities to
advance U.S. national objectives around the world
with little or no warning to the adversary or target and
with potential effects ranging from subtle to severely
damaging. The development and sustainment of
OCEO capabilities, however, may require
considerable time and effort if access and tools for a
specific target do not already exist.”
They further offer something of a mission statement:
“The United States Government shall identify
potential targets of national importance where OCEO
can offer a favorable balance of effectiveness and risk
as compared with other instruments of national power,
establish and maintain OCEO capabilities integrated
as appropriate with other U.S. offensive capabilities,
and execute those capabilities in a manner consistent
with the provisions of this directive.”
Political science literature argues that military
entities — such as those addressed by PPD-20 — are
more prone to favor offensive operations than other
kinds of bureaucracies [50]. Early evidence suggests
that this “cult of the offensive” operates regarding
cyber warfare. For example, James Cartwright, the
former Vice Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of

Staff, called for the United States to engage in more
offensive cyber operations, and reportedly created a
bureaucracy to that end [44]. And while government
agencies, such as the U.S. National Security Agency
(NSA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and
the Defense Department's Cyber Command are
responsible for defending government networks using
offensive techniques, private companies are largely
left to defend themselves on their own. In the wake of
enormous cyberattacks on such companies as Uber,
Equifax, Yahoo, and Sony, and the theft of e-mails
from the DNC’s server, some members of Congress
are trying to pass a significant revision of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act [41].
The bipartisan bill, known as the Active Cyber
Defense Certainty Act (ACDCA), gives individuals
and companies the legal authority to take action on
networks, servers, and other infrastructures they do not
own to establish attribution of an attack, disrupt an
ongoing attack, and monitor the attacker. The bill
proposes “to provide a defense to prosecution for fraud
and related activity in connection with computers for
persons defending against unauthorized intrusions into
their computers.” The majority of hacking incidents
involve groups or nation-states that attack from servers
outside of the United States — and outside the
jurisdiction of the ACDCA legislation. Ultimately, the
ACDCA wants to enable broader active cyber defense
abilities to the private sector. Government
legislation could make similar instances of collateral
damage more common.
Some experts acknowledged that many companies
already are pursuing attackers in ways that could be
considered violations of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1986. The Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act of 1986 prohibits anyone from “knowingly”
accessing a computer “without authorization.” The
changes would permit companies, and private citizens,
that are victims of cybercrimes to “hack-back,” also
referred to as active-defense [20]. It is essential for our
society to be prepared and for businesses and
governments to be ahead of the attackers and other
actors with malicious intents. But this presents
difficulties.

4. Offensive Cyber Attribution
Law enforcement and military authorities seeking
to check malicious cyber activity face a fundamental
challenge: the “attribution problem” [43]. This entails
the task of identifying the author of a cyber-attack or
cyber-exploitation. The attribution problem permeates
the cybersecurity literature. Rid & Buchanan [39]
noted that “the attribution debate is evolving
surprisingly slowly,” with an excessive focus on
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technical forensics. They argued that attribution is not
impossible for the defender, because even the most
sophisticated attackers ultimately make mistakes, but
it is difficult and resource-intensive, requiring
specialized skills and substantial time invested.
Moreover, a clever adversary can mask its tracks by
routing attacks or exploitations through anonymizing
computers around the globe.
Attributing a cyber operation through common
techniques such as technical forensics, as well as other
intelligence sources and situational context [3],
reverse-engineering [7], source tracking [29],
honeypots [48], and sink-holing [4] can prove
difficult. Sometimes traceback and related forensic
tools can provide adequate attribution. Human and
other forms of intelligence-gathering can further aid in
cyber attribution. The difficulty of this problem stems
not only from the amount of effort required to find
forensic clues, but also the ease with which an attacker
can embed false clues to mislead security
professionals [43]. Without sufficient attribution, it is
not possible to enforce policy, law, or pacts to support
business and government objectives. The inability to
enforce laws makes creating new ones meaningless
and gives malicious attackers little motivation to
behave. Additionally, distinguishing between statesponsored and private attacks has been under debate
for years, making criteria for state responsibility
unsettled. There are growing calls to deal with the
cyber-attribution problem by making a nation
responsible for all cyber-attacks that emerge from
within its borders, even if the attacks are not sponsored
by that nation [8]. Such calls increase the impetus to
gain control of the online environment and on those
who will act badly within it.
Foreign intelligence organizations are constantly
trying to break into the networks that undergird U.S.
military operations. Amid all this, military
organizations have noted the success of cyber
attackers in damaging computer systems and have
hoped to use these same techniques or “exploits” for
military advantage, much as they seek a wide variety
of ways to gain advantage in warfare [11]. This is
accomplished by employing offensive security
engineers in the fight against cyber attribution using
offensive techniques. The United States promotes its
cyber warriors as the best at offense, with the
capability of using cyberweapons against their
adversaries [9], cyberweapons that can be launched or
controlled either externally, from another computer or
the Internet, or internally, by spies and saboteurs [25].
The goal of using cyberweapons is to take control of a
system without the knowledge of the system's owner
so it can be used for the offensive engineer’s purposes,
called “rootkits” [26]. Sets of such remotely controlled

computers can be used to create “botnets,” networks
of computers gathered under the control of a single
user [1]. Hacker botnets have been used for monetary
gain by sending spam or phishing email from the slave
computers, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against
organizations, sending ransomware to blackmail
organizations by threatening malicious mischief, and
engaging in cyber-espionage. Botnets developed for
military purposes could stop an adversary’s military
from communicating or fully deploying its weapon
systems, making their development attractive.
The DHS, NSA and Cyber Command’s strategy
for recruiting hackers relies, in part, on appeals to
malice and mischievousness: at security conferences
(e.g., Black Hat, DEFCON, B-Sides), agency
representatives often pitch prospective applicants by
promising work that might otherwise land them in
prison. These recruiters often describe the job function
as an “ethical hacker” or “white hat.” Some security
experts question whether the term “ethical hacker” is
a contradiction in terms, as hacking was originally
defined as a criminal activity and still carries that
resonance. Conrad Constantine, a security research
engineer at AlienVault, stated “The term ‘ethical’ is
unnecessary – it is not logical to refer to a hacker as an
‘ethical hacker’ because they have moved over from
the ‘dark side’ into ‘the light’… The reason companies
want to employ a hacker is not because they know the
‘rules’ to hacking, but because of the very fact that
they do not play by the rules” (as cited in [2], p. 66). It
is prudent to suspect that prior unprofessional hacking
conduct eventually may overflow into official job
duties. Few have mastered the rare art of maintaining
multiple dispositions. Maintaining ethical standards
for red-hat hackers, then, becomes an important
concern.

5. Vice versus Virtue
Fieser [16] noted that, “The field of ethics (or
moral philosophy) involves systematizing, defending,
and recommending concepts of right and wrong
behavior” [16]. Normative ethics is a subfield that
seeks to develop a set of morals or guiding principles
to influence the conduct of individuals and groups
within a population (e.g., professional, religious, or
societal). Virtue ethics are currently one of three major
approaches in normative ethics. In it, virtues are values
behind ethical actions or principles behind codes of
conduct, moral properties that people use to act
ethically. Human nature, social norms, and workplace
culture generally pull one toward virtues. Vice, then,
is simply a deficiency or excess of virtue; virtue and
vice are not exclusive or binary, but exist on continua
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with one another, with virtue generally implying or
even containing vice [30].
Some hackers who formerly engaged in thrillseeking computer crimes are now assisting or
employed by governments and companies to establish
and maintain security practices by testing system
vulnerability with their own specialized knowledge,
thus helping to foil the activities of “black hat”
malevolent cyber-attackers. This raises some ethical
issues, particularly the question of whether such
offensive hackers emphasize computer security as a
professional virtue or whether they hack as a socially
legitimatized vice. Hackers often discuss their
motivations for hacking. These are sometimes
characterized as self-justifications, as explanations, or
as agonized struggles with personal obsessions and
failures [24]. Additionally, hackers often confess to an
addiction to computers or computer networks, a
feeling that they are compelled to hack. The
motivations offered by perhaps the most famous of all
hackers, Kevin Mitnick, provides a common
articulation of motivations for hacking [24]:
“You get a better understanding of cyberspace, the
computer systems, the operating systems, how the
computer systems interact with one another, that
basically was my motivation behind my hacking
activity in the past. It was just from the gain of
knowledge and the thrill of adventure, nothing that
was well and truly sinister as trying to get any type of
monetary gain or anything.”
In response to this dilemma, it could be argued that
hackers have an ethic or ethos (Greek meaning
custom, habit, character, or disposition) that is
grounded in the ethical use of computers. There is
evidence of such an ethic, which is not imposed by
organizational codes of conduct [40], but is based on
an intrinsic set of values and beliefs, inspired by an
inherent respect for computers and the information
they contain — and the cyber-attribution of those who
do not share this respect. For example, some hackers
have spent large amounts of their own time, for no
apparent financial gain, in obsessively tracking down
malicious cyber-attackers and bringing them to
account for the damage they have caused, not only to
organizations, but to the ethos of the former hacking
community [45, 46]. But while the hacker ethic in
response to cyber-attribution is one of exploration and
retaliation without thought of virtue or consequences,
tolerance of cyber-retaliation has changed over time,
since threats and cyber harm have become more
serious [28]. Thus, again, the ethical postures of those
who would undertake offensive cybersecurity

activities is a matter of concern for individuals,
companies, and nations.

6. Methodology
A quantitative survey and descriptive statistics
were adopted for this study. Data was collected
through self-reporting using convenience sampling.
This study focused primarily on offensive security
engineers as the population being studied. Offensive
security engineers are individuals that use hacking
techniques to perform their jobs. Because the study
was intended to reach a difficult demographic to
survey, a “thank you” splash page at the end of the
survey asked subjects to recommend friends to the
survey, creating a self-perpetuating sample in
accordance with the process of the snowball sampling
technique.
In accordance with previously cited literature on
hackers and computer security, the authors developed
a survey instrument from the collection of preceding
literature and articles. For the purpose of the survey
design and data analysis, the authors organized
questions that would be non-intrusive to the target
population of offensive security engineers and
hackers.
The research setting is non-contrived because
participants used their computers or mobile devices to
take the web-based survey. In addition to a web-based
survey link, quick response (QR) codes were
distributed electronically via LinkedIn groups and
Twitter hacker communities.
A 12-item survey was developed and implemented
using a Survey Monkey form. The survey included 10
questions that captured the perceptions of the “hack
back” initiatives and ethical interpretations. Therefore,
this survey seeks to gain feedback from offensive
security engineers, red/black teams, or other hackers
responsible for pursuing attackers as a key part of their
job function.
Survey responses were analyzed using frequency
analysis and Pearson’s Chi-square (p < .05) and
categorical analysis among demographic variables.

6.1 Participants
The final dataset for statistical analyses included
123 respondents. Of the 123 respondents, 115 (93.5%)
were men and eight (6.5%) were women; the majority
of the respondents were between the ages of 35 and 44
years (35.77%). Demographic statistics are displayed
in Table 1.
Gender and age are often used in the reporting of
demographic data; however, previous studies have
varied in their use for examining statistical
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differences. Researchers, Mensch and Wilkie [35]
found differences in security attitude between men and
women.
Table 1: Demographics (Age and Gender)

Table 2: Survey Questions ( Frequency and Category Analysis)

Note: When p < .05 at significance level, items are non-significant, as denoted with (NS).
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7. Results
As shown in Table 1, more males than females
participated in the survey. Research for this study and
literature on hackers has not uncovered any significant
evidence of female hackers [49]. This imbalance is
disproportionate even in the field of computermediated technologies [47]. A number of factors
explain the paucity of women generally in the
computer sciences: childhood socialization, where
boys are taught to relate to technology more easily
than girls; education in computers occurs in a
masculine environment; and a gender bias toward men
in the language used in computer science [47, 49].
Table 2 presents the frequency and categorical
analyses of survey responses by the respondents. The
following discussion examines the frequency analysis
for each table first followed by the categorical
analysis.

7.1 Frequency Analysis
The survey contained 10 questions designed to
assess how offensive security engineers or hackers
report their own vices from a security perspective
(Table 2). The questions were worded not to insinuate
a hacker’s vice. The available responses to these
questions were in a “Strongly Agree to Strongly
Disagree” 5-point Likert scale format.
Of the 123 respondents, 57.7% (strongly agree,
n=71) and 30.1% (agree, n=37) had knowledge of the
terms “active cyber defense” or “hack back.” Also,
26.8% (strongly agree, n=33) and 26% (agree, n=32)
said that they find satisfaction in offensively
mitigating attacks, while 23.6% (strongly agree, n=29)
and 26.8% (agree, n=33) self-reported that private
companies should be allowed to “hack back” their
adversaries. Additionally, 35% (strongly disagree,
n=43) and 31.7% (disagree, n=39) self-reported that
they do not find it unethical to pursue adversaries in
foreign countries. Further, 21.1% (strongly agree,
n=26) and 24.4% (agree, n=30) self-reported that there
should be no prosecution for anyone who defends
against foreign adversaries. In regard to motive, 28.5%
(strongly agree, n=35) and 31.7% (agree, n=39)
reported that they enjoy hacking and creating new
offensive techniques or tools. Surprisingly, 43.1%
(n=53) did not agree or disagree with whether they
were torn between company ethics and performing
offensive job functions.
When summing the responses for questions Q2 and
Q10 respectively, 47.9% (n=59) of respondents
reported that it is not part of their job function to “hack
back” adversaries. On the other hand, 39.8% (n=49)

reported that they would protect their network at all
costs and 32.5% neither agreed nor disagreed.

7.2 Categorical Analysis
In addition to the descriptive measures reported
above in Table 2, categorical analysis was done on
demographic data in the study. The variables used
were gender and age group. No predictions were made
on these variables; the study was exploratory.
Table 2 contains Pearson’s chi-squared statistics
for each of the demographic variables. The only
variable with more than one significant result was
gender. Males responded more frequently (n=115)
than females (n=8) and differently on all questions (p<
.05). Thus, we present the following analysis:
One significant difference was found for each of
the age and gender variables. For age under Q10, “I
will protect my company network from attackers at
any cost,” more respondents between the ages of 25
and 34 would protect their company network from
foreign adversaries no matter the cost. The significant
result was p=.016. On one hand, this may not be
surprising — one might expect this age range to be
quicker to attack their adversaries. Although the
Pearson’s chi-squared was p=.051 and not significant
for Q3, it is still worthy to mention that more males
find satisfaction in offensively protecting their
company’s network. Finally, for gender significance
in Q1, “I am familiar with the industry terms ‘active
cyber defense’ or ‘hack back,’ more males understood
the terms (p=.002) presented in Q1. Among all
respondents, only one female had never heard of the
terms.

8. Conclusion
It is fair to conclude that the research question was
answered. Based on the respondent’s self-report, we
found that the majority do not find it unethical to “hack
back” adversaries in nation-states and that private
companies should be given the right to retaliate
without prosecution. Additionally, based on the
frequency analysis, there appears to exist a dichotomy
of vice versus virtue among offensive security
engineers. A few of the questions elicited a high
percentage of undecided (neither agree nor disagree)
responses; this alludes to such a dichotomy.
As cybercrime continues to be an increasing and
evolving threat, attention must turn toward long-term
solutions. Simply blocking these attacks does not do
so, but instead allows cybercriminals to improve their
attacks, which is relatively easy to do in the current
environment. Attribution is one of the most promising
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ways to increase the risks associated with performing
cybercrime, and therefore provide a way to reduce the
frequency of cybercrime.
Most public discussion has centered on defense
against cyberattacks on governmental, military, and
economic concerns. Cyber activities can have
defensive or offensive purposes. Defensive cyber
activities include upgrading or restoring a computer
system that has been damaged, investigating damage
in the computer system, and maintaining situational
awareness of computer systems and networks.
Offensive cyber activities are the insertion of
computer programs into an attacker’s computer
system to observe and collect transmitted information;
the disruption, degradation, or destruction of the
software of a system; the destruction of the hardware
of a system; and the manipulation of a computer
system to use it to cause further damage [42].
The hiring point for the government and most
businesses is that hackers have considerable skillsets
and knowledge about telecommunications, data
security, operating systems, programming languages,
networks, and cryptography as opposed to less skilled
security professionals. Hackers are being employed to
perform such offensive cyber activities. The offensive
or red-hat hackers who have developed their unique
skills by breaking into company and government
systems are now being employed for purposes of
offensive security against their former colleagues. The
hacker ethos for securing computer systems is soon
overshadowed by the vice of hacking for the thrill of
it. The “attribution problem” will have consequences,
requiring offensive hackers to identify and retaliate
against attackers on domestic and foreign soil,
rejecting state toleration of such cyber-adversaries.
In today’s ever-evolving cyber threat landscape
where cyber attackers are constantly searching for new
ways to circumvent existing security and legislative
controls to commit cybercriminal activities, it is
essential for offensive hackers to possess current
knowledge, skills, and experiences. It is unrealistic to
expect that government agencies have all the cyber
security expertise required in securing the nation’s
critical infrastructures. Therefore the “hack-back”
initiative is slowly gaining momentum to legalize
cyber-retaliation methods among businesses, currently
prohibited by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

9. Future Research
The paper as a whole is more interested in laying
out the problem and its scope than in actually
addressing the problem. Context is essential, to be
sure, but the argument can be made that the possibility
of vice overwhelming virtue among red-hat hackers

and the ongoing concerns with cyber attribution
present significant risks for the conduct of offensive
cybersecurity activities, and that this issue needs to be
given more attention (and space) than it currently
receives.
The main limitations to this research are: (1)
offensive hacker perceptions were measured as
opposed to their actual behavior, and (2) the
generalizability of the study is limited because the
target participants only included offensive security
engineers and hackers from a small population. The
sample was unselected and is unlikely to contain many
high-rate hackers. Future research might be usefully
conducted in other hacker communities or conferences
(i.e. Black Hat or DEFCON).
Therefore, one goal of future research would be to
demonstrate
through
more
behavioral
evidence/attestation whether or not vice does
overwhelm. Future investigations should consider
developing a survey instrument, based on prior
research, to measure the virtues and vices of offensive
security professionals. The research would also
possibly address philosophical systems that argue that
vice inevitably wins out; these philosophies may
provide a useful perspective on the general issue.
Given that many hackers perceive themselves as
libertarian or even Randian, those ideologies also may
need to be investigated as a starting point for this work.
Further discussions in the information security
field should be about the issue of trust. Some security
professionals are opposed to hiring hackers for
security work. Dr. Eugene Spafford of Purdue
University is quoted as saying, “Do not do business
with any company that hires a convicted hacker to
work in the security area. …This is like having a
known arsonist install a fire alarm.” Those entities that
do hire hackers overlook their potential for engaging
in vice and hire them based on an extensive
background check and assumption that they will
perform their job functions and not violate the
organization’s trust or the trust of their clients. Most
hired hackers do not misuse their power as they know
they are being trusted with something important, and
they want to live up to that trust. There are differing
beliefs throughout the information technology
community that favor both sides of the discussion.
However, the importance of cybersecurity differs
based on the differing focuses of the individual
organizations. This also could be a topic of future
research.
To stay ahead of its adversaries, the United States
must constantly adjust and improve its cyber offenses
and defenses. The U.S. government’s ability to defend
its networks always lags behind its adversaries’ ability
to exploit critical infrastructure’s weaknesses.
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Classifications of critical infrastructures vary across
countries, but are united by the thought that the
relevant asset must be “vital” to count as critical. DHS
states that, “Critical infrastructure are the assets,
systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so
vital to the United States that their incapacitation or
destruction would have a debilitating effect on
security, national economic security, national public
health or safety, or any combination thereof.” It is
unclear whether additional vulnerabilities are
introduced to the critical infrastructure by performing
offensive techniques or whether this is an underlying
concern of the government. Further research may dive
deeper into this question.
To date it has proven difficult to define clear rules
of engagement for responding to cyberattacks. These
rules of engagement will first have to assist in
distinguishing among the exploits of a mere hacker,
criminal activity (such as fraud or theft), espionage, or
an attack by a foreign government entity [31]. The
rules will need to describe or at least suggest what is
necessary, appropriate, relative, and justified in each
particular case, based on relevant domestic and
international laws. Therefore, policy structures and
ethics of offensive security techniques would be worth
examining in future research.

[8] Clarke, Richard Alan, and Robert K. Knake. Cyber war.
Tantor Media, Incorporated, 2014.
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